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WESTCHESTER MEDIA CO. L.P., ET AL. v. PRL USA HOLDINGS,
INC.: THE FIGHT OVER THE NAME, "POLO"
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is impossible to own the name Polo just as it is impossible to
own the name soccer or tennis."' Many shared this sentiment when
"[a] onetime horseman's magazine, now full of ads from the likes
of Gucci and Lexus, was told by a federal court to start running
disclaimers saying it has nothing to do with fashion design house
Polo Ralph Lauren Corp." 2 Westchester Media Company v. PRL USA
Holdings3 underscores the high stakes involved in protecting a
brand name when PRL USA Holdings ("PRL") sought to prevent
Westchester Media Corporation ("Westchester") from using
"POLO" as its magazine title. 4 In so doing, PRL's claim against
Westchester implicated the latter's First Amendment right to
choose an appropriate title for its literary works. 5 Consequently,
the Fifth Circuit had to decide whether a fashion design house or
an official sports publication had a greater right to the name
"POLO."6
This note focuses on the Fifth Circuit's trademark infringe-
ment and dilution analysis that led to "Polo Magazine get[ting]
1. Lisa Brownlee, Polo Ralph Lauren Turns Up Heat in Fight With Magazine Pub-
lisher, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1997, at B8 (quoting Alan Brew, partner for Addison
Seefeld & Brew, brand-strategy-consulting firm in San Francisco).
2. Wendy Bounds, Polo Magazine Gets Whipped by Lauren, WALL ST. J., July 7,
1998, at BIO.
3. 103 F. Supp. 2d 935 (S.D. Tex. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 214 F.3d 658
(5th Cir. 2000).
4. See id.
5. See 5th Circuit Upholds POLO Injunction, 6 No. 10 INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST 1
(July 2000).
6. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935, 940
(S.D. Tex. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part, 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). The sport
of polo has a history stretching over two thousand years. See United States Polo
Association, Polo-History of the Game, at http://www.uspolo.org/history.html (Jan. 7,
2002).
Through the Middle Ages, polo was considered to be valuable training for
cavalries ranging from Constantinople to Japan. See id. In the 1850s, the British
Cavalry drew up the earliest rules, and by 1869, the game was well established in
England. See id. In 1876, the sport made its way to New York, and within ten years,
there were major clubs all over the Eastern United States. See id. By the 1930s,
polo was an Olympic sport, and today there are two hundred and twenty-five mem-
ber clubs in the USPA with over 3,000 players. See id.
(351)
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whipped by Lauren. '7 Section II describes the facts that gave rise to
this case.8 Section III discusses the applicable areas of law consid-
ered, including the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act ("FTDA") and several state law claims. 9 The Fifth Circuit's anal-
ysis and disposition of the issues are covered in detail in Section
IV.10 Section V analyzes the Fifth Circuit's decision, which adopted
a new standard for establishing dilution under the FTDA.'1 In con-
clusion, Section VI explores the impact of Westchester Media on simi-
lar suits in the future. 12
II. FACTS
Fashion design house, Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. ("PRL"), sued
magazine publisher, Westchester Media Company ("Westchester"),
alleging both trademark infringement of its "Polo" mark under the
Lanham Trademark Act and dilution of that mark under the Fed-
eral Trademark Dilution Act. 13 Since 1967, Ralph Lauren has been
involved in the fashion and design business, building PRL into a
successful multi-billion dollar company that sells fashion apparel,
accessories, home furnishings and men's and women's designer fra-
grances. 14 In conducting this business, PRL has registered a num-
ber of trademarks with the Patent and Trademark Office, including
the word "POLO."15 PRL asserts that after thirty years of continu-
ously using its registered trademarks, those marks have become fa-
7. Bounds, supra note 2, at B10.
8. For a discussion of the facts of Westchester Media Co., see infra notes 13-36
and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the background of the Lanham Act, the FTDA, and
other applicable law, see infra notes 37-109 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the court's analysis and holding in Westchester Media
Co., see infra notes 110-99 and accompanying text.
11. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see infta notes 200-14 and accom-
panying text.
12. For a discussion of the impact of Westchester Media Co., see infra notes 219-
23 and accompanying text.
13. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1999), affd 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
14. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 940. In the last four years
alone, PRL sold approximately four billion dollars wholesale value of products
bearing various "Polo" trademarks. See id. PRL advertises extensively in newspa-
pers, trade publications and magazines. See id. In fact, articles have been written
about PRL's products and Ralph Lauren himself in such magazines as Time, Fi-
nancial World and Town and Country. See id.
15. See id. These "Polo" trademarks, while all remain in effect and several
have become incontestable under the Lanham Act, do not include a POLO trade-
mark for use on a publication of any kind. See id.
Vol. 8: p. 351
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mous, and the word "POLO" has come to be closely identified with
both Ralph Lauren and PRL.16
Westchester, on the other hand, is a magazine publisher who,
prior to the summer of 1997, focused solely on topical specialty
magazines like "Cowboys and Indians. ' 17 In May 1997, however,
Westchester and its general partner, Novasota Holding Company
("Novasota"), purchased all of the assets of POLO magazine from
Fleet Street Publishing and its owner, Ami Shinitzky.18 Those assets
included its trademark rights to the name "POLO."19
Ami Shinitzky founded POLO magazine ("Old POLO Maga-
zine") in 1975 as a polo enthusiast and as a member of the United
States Polo Association ("USPA").20 Until the sale to Westchester in
1997, the Old POLO Magazine was a special interest magazine, and
the magazine's devotion to the sport earned its endorsement as the
"Official Publication" of the USPA. 21 Under Shinitzky's direction,
16. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 661
(5th Cir. 2000) (noting since 1967, PRL has built image known to national and
international consumers).
17. See id. at 661.
18. See id. John B. Goodman, sole shareholder of Novasota, is an avid polo
player with strong ties to the United States Polo Association (USPA). See id. He is
captain of the top-ranked polo team that has represented the United States in the
international Westchester Cup tournament. See id. Additionally, he has been a
member of the USPA since 1989 and serves on the boards of two USPA commit-
tees. See id. He is also on the board of directors of the Houston Polo Club, where
he was president in 1994 and 1995. See id.
19. See id. Shinitzky and Fleet Street acquired trademark registrations in
1992. They read:
(1) Registration No. 1,691,432 for "POLO", a "magazine on the subject
of equestrian sports and lifestyles";
(2) Registration No. 1,677,088 for a "horse and rider design" for "maga-
zine publication services", and the design which appears on the mast-
head of POLO magazine; and
(3) Registration No. 1,710,894 for "POLO Life", a "magazine dealing
with equestrian sports and lifestyles."
Id.
Initially, when Fleet Street applied for registration with the Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO"), it sought protection for the "POLO Co." name concerning:
"equestrian magazines and periodicals." See Westchester Media, 103 F. Supp. 2d at
942. The PTO refused the application because: 1) the mark "merely described
the subject matter of the applicant's publication;" and 2) the Trademark Trial and
Appeals Board and the courts have consistently held that marks which describe the
subject matter of publications are deemed to be "descriptive." Id. The examining
attorney suggested that Fleet Street adopt the identification of "magazines on the
subject of equestrian sports and lifestyles." Id.
20. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661 (emphasizing POLO Magazine's his-
tory is critical to dispute at hand).
21. See id. Old POLO Magazine was "an insider's view of the sport of polo and
the international society and ... traditions that surround it." Id. In an article on
the history of the Old POLO Magazine from August 1997, Shinitzky wrote that the
magazine "hit its stride with a formulaic mixture of game coverage, personality and
2002] 353
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Old POLO Magazine and PRL enjoyed a "peaceful coexistence,"' 22
even though Shinitzky began publishing Old POLO Magazine with
an expanded 'lifestyle' section in 1989, called "POLO Life."23 In
1992, Shinitzky obtained federal registration for POLO as a "maga-
zine on the subject of equestrian sports and lifestyles." 24
In 1997, Westchester purchased all assets of the Old POLO
Magazine and re-launched the magazine with the same name
("New POLO Magazine").25 Westchester described the New POLO
Magazine as "not about the sport, but rather [about] an adventur-
ous approach to living life."2 6 Westchester's re-launching efforts in-
cluded purchasing Neiman Marcus' customer list to send
promotional materials and a free copy of the magazine to over a
million of those customers.27 Additionally, Westchester chose fash-
ion model, Claudia Schiffer, to appear on the inaugural issue's
cover.28 Finally, Westchester published a separate magazine called
"Polo Player's Edition" that focused primarily on the sport, mirror-
ing that of Old POLO Magazine. 29
club profiles, rules, opinions, history and how-to and horsemanship articles." Id.
In addition, Old POLO's advertising base dealt primarily with horses, riding and
polo equipment. See id. See also 5th Circuit Affirms Infringement Finding, Remands on
Remedy, 8 No. 19 MEALEY's LrIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP. 10 (July 3, 2000) (describing
the history and outcome of this case).
22. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661-62 (explaining that Shinitzky inter-
viewed Ralph Lauren shortly after magazine's founding, PRL frequently advertised
in magazine and PRL never complained about magazine's use of "Polo" mark).
23. See id. at 662. A trade journal, Ad Week, described one of these issues in
1989 as bearing "a striking resemblance to one of Lauren's ads. It's loaded with
pictures of upscale people having a good time at country clubs." Id. (quoting one
of several entities finding similarities between old POLO and PRL). Although PRL
was aware of the Ad Week article, it continued to advertise in Old POLO Magazine
without any objection. See id. (noting Ad Week was not only entity finding similari-
ties between old POLO and PRL).
24. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 943. The Patent and Trade-
mark Office number for "POLO" Magazine is Registration No. 1,691,432. See id.
25. See id. Unlike Shinitzky's magazine, the re-launched magazine carried the
tagline "Adventure. Elegance. Sport." See id. New POLO Magazine also changed
the target audience and distribution methods. See id.
26. Id. at 945.
27. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 662. Neiman Marcus is one of PRL's
largest retailers. See id.
28. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 945 (noting this was only one
year after Schiffer was PRL's featured model in one of their exclusive advertising
campaigns).
29. See id. at 943 (explaining that Old POLO Magazine was forerunner of
Polo Player's Edition and is perfectly consistent with the theme of sport-centered
periodical including profiles of celebrity players, supporters of polo and features
concerning sport venues).
[Vol. 8: p. 351
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Initially, Westchester attempted and succeeded in maintaining
the magazine's relationship with PRL. 30 In September 1997, how-
ever, everything changed when the designer formally objected to
New POLO Magazine's use of the name "POLO" as the title of the
new magazine.3 1 In response, Westchester filed a declaratory judg-
ment action against PRL, seeking a determination of its right to use
"POLO" as the title for the magazine. 32 PRL answered by filing
counterclaims alleging trademark infringement and dilution. 33
PRL further sought injunctive relief under state law claims of unfair
competition and injury to business reputation. 34 In response, West-
chester raised the defenses of laches, acquiescence, trademark in-
contestability and a First Amendment right to appropriately name
its literary work.35 The District Court held in favor of PRL and is-
sued a permanent injunction against Westchester's use of "POLO"
for its fashion magazine's title.36
30. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 662-
63 (5th Cir. 2000). Westchester contacted PRL, secured a meeting with Elizabeth
Morris and made an advertising sales pitch. See id. at 663. The pitch included two
'mock-up" covers of the New POLO Magazine, neither of which was ever used for
the New POLO Magazine. See id. One cover depicted a horse, but Westchester did
not put a horse on the cover until over a year after its re-launch. See id. Slaughter
testified that Morris reacted positively to his presentation. See id. PRL asserted that
Morris made a clear objection to the magazine's title. See id.
31. See id. at 663. In September 1997, PRL's advertising agency invited West-
chester to an event, allowing them to solicit advertising agreements with PRL, but
rescinded the invitation. See id. Later, on September 23, 1997, PRL formally ob-
jected to the title of the New POLO Magazine. See id. (asserting PRL made clear
objection to magazine's title).
32. See id. (claiming its magazine on "equestrian sports and lifestyles" does not
infringe on PRL's "Polo" mark),
33. See id. PRL alleged trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1)(A) and trademark dilution
under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3). See id.
34. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (requiring Westchester to disseminate "disclaimer
which states clearly that POLO Magazine has no affiliation, sponsorship, or associa-
tion with Ralph Lauren, or any Ralph Lauren entities").
35. See id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's treatment of Westchester's
defenses, see infra notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
36. See id. The magistrate judge held that:
(1) supplier showed likelihood of confusion leading to conclusion that supplied
published or sponsored magazine;
(2) alternatively, supplier showed likelihood of dilution of trademark;
(3) incontestable nature of publisher's trademark for "Polo," as used with eques-
trian magazine, did not carry over into new format;
(4) First Amendment did not bar issuance of injunction;
(5) Supplier was not barred from seeking injunction under doctrines of laches or
acquiescence;
(6) Supplier satisfied irreparable injury, balance of harms and public interest re-
quirements for injunction;
(7) Removal of name was required; and
2002] 355
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III. BACKGROUND
A. The Lanham Act
The Federal Trademark Act of 1946, the "Lanham Act," is the
codification of trademark law in the United States.3 7 The purpose
of the Lanham Act is to consolidate, amend and codify all pre-ex-
isting trademark law to prevent the reasonably prudent consumer
from being confused as to the source or sponsorship of products
and services in a given marketplace.3 8
The Lanham Act defines a trademark as "any word, name, sym-
bol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a
manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others. '39 This defini-
tion demonstrates that the primary function of a trademark is to be
distinctive. 40 Specifically, trademarks are "commercial substitutes
(8) Attorney fees would not be assessed.
See id.
37. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). For a complete legislative history of
the Lanham Act, see Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act & the Social Function of
Trademarks, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 177-84 (1949).
38. See S. Res. 1333, 79th Cong. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274.
The Senate Committee on Patents said that:
The purpose of this bill is to place all matters relating to trade-marks in
one statute and to eliminate judicial obscurity, to simplify registration
and to make it stronger and more liberal, to dispense with mere technical
prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make procedure simple, and re-
lief against infringement prompt and effective .... There can be no
doubt.., that the protection of trademarks is merely protection of good
will, to prevent diversion of trade through misrepresentation and the pro-
tection of the public against deception [and] a sound public policy re-
quires that trademarks should receive nationally the greatest protection
that can be given them.
1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1277. See Peter W. Smith, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer
Confusion: A Workable Lanham Act Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZo L. REv. 1525,
1529-30 (1991) (explaining requirements and protections of Lanham Act).
39. JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 27-44
(The Michie Company 1991). There are four general functions of trademarks: 1)
to establish its distinctive identity by distinguishing itself from the competition; 2)
to establish that all products and services bearing the same name are of equal
quality; 3) to signify that goods bearing the same trademark come from the same
source; and 4) to aid in the sale of goods and services. See id. These functions
enable sellers/manufacturers to establish goodwill and create "buyer momentum"
and "the lure to return." J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND
PRIVACY 104, 104-05 (Clark, Boardman, and Callagham, 1993).
40. In discussing the purpose and significance of trademarks in the market
setting, Justice Frankfurter stated the following:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychologi-
cal function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising
short-cut that induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has
been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human
[Vol. 8: p. 351
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for one's own autographic signature, certifying to the genuineness
of the goods to which they are affixed."4 1
A trademark "does not [, however,] confer a right to prohibit
the use of the word or words.... A trade-mark [sic] only gives the
right to prohibit the use of [the word] so far as to protect the
owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his." 42
The Senate Committee on Patents, which is the reviewing body of
the trademark bill, found trademarks to be the essence of competi-
tion.43 The Senate Committee valued the Lanham Act as a tool to
ensure fair competition by making possible a choice between distin-
guishable competing articles, protecting the public from deceit, fos-
tering fair competition and securing to the business community the
advantages of reputation and goodwill. 44
Under the Lanham Act, a plaintiff who owns a federally regis-
tered trademark, may take federal action based upon, inter alia, un-
propensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the
means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark, in
the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon
which it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has some-
thing of value. If another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of
the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1941).
41. 87 C.J.S. Trade-marks § 1, 219 (1954). See also Baila H. Celedonia, Review
of Basic Principles of Trademark Law, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADEMARK LAW at
9 (1994).
42. S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275
(quoting Prestonettes v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924)). "[The Trademark Bill]
has as its object the protection of trademarks, securing to the owner the good will
of his business and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marked
goods." Smith, supra note 38, at 1529-30 (providing general overview of require-
ments and protections of Lanham Act).
43. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946) (noting importance of trademarks in
distinguishing competing goods and services in any given marketplace).
44. See id. See also 1 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 2:1, at 44-49 (2d ed. 1984). Four categories of trademark strength with corre-
sponding levels of protection include: 1) arbitrary and fanciful marks; 2) sugges-
tive marks; 3) descriptive marks; and 4) generic marks. See McCARTHY, supra note
39, at 74. Arbitrary and fanciful marks receive the highest protection because they
are inherently distinctive. See id. They unquestionably identify a specific product
or entity and create a greater likelihood of confusion if third parties use such
names. See id. Alternatively, if the mark simply carries a descriptive name, it will
not be given the same level of protection because the likelihood of confusion is
less. See id. To determine whether a mark is descriptive, three factors are consid-
ered: 1) if the mark describes the product or service it identifies, or 2) describes
the geographic location from which the goods or services originate, or 3) consti-
tutes a person's last name. See id. Generic names receive no protection. See id.
2002] 357
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fair competition, trademark infringement or dilution.45 Plaintiffs
may also pursue federal remedies in the absence of federal registra-
tion for unfair competition under theories of, inter alia, fraud, false
advertising or infringement. 46 If a plaintiff owns a mark registered
with a state, she may sue under infringement or unfair competi-
tion. 47 Plaintiffs may also proceed under common law rights of, in-
ter alia, infringement, unfair competition, dilution or invasion of
right to publicity.48 Typical defenses to trademark infringement
and unfair competition include, inter alia, incontestability, aban-
donment, acquiescence, laches, unclean hands, fraud, fair use and
the denial of a likelihood of confusion.49
B. Trademark Infringement
The owner of a registered trademark may bring an action for
infringement under the Lanham Act when another uses: 1) any re-
production, counterfeit, copy or color imitation of a mark; 2) with-
out the registrant's consent; 3) in commerce; 4) in connection with
a sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertising of goods; 5)
where such use is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception. 50
In the Fifth Circuit, a trademark infringement action requires
a two-step analysis: determining whether the claimant has a protect-
able right in its mark; and, if so, whether there is infringement as
determined by the likelihood of confusion. 51 The Fifth Circuit's
45. See S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N supra
note 38, at 1976. The Committee stated that in regard to the protection afforded
to trademark holders: "There is no essential difference between trademark in-
fringement and what is loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition is
the genus of which trademark infringement is one of the species; the law of trade-
mark is but a part of the broader law of unfair competition." Id. at 4, reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 38, at 1975 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Rectanus, 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918)). For an authoritative review of federal legal theories upon
which plaintiffs might sue, see MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 33:1; see also Balarum
Gupta, Names and Logos: Protection under Intellectual Property Laws and Consequences, 2
SPORTS LAw. J. 245, 253 (1995).
46. SeeJeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags:
An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 247-51 (1998) (discussing legal reme-
dies in absence of federal registration); see also McCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 33:3.
47. See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 46, at 249-61 (discussing state legal theo-
ries upon which plaintiffs might sue); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 33:2.
48. See McCARTHY, supra note 44, at § 33:4 (discussing common law rights
upon which plaintiffs might sue).
49. See id. at § 33:4 (discussing typical defenses to trademark infringement
and unfair competition).
50. See Robert Lattinville, Logo Cops: The Law and Business of Collegiate Licens-
ing, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 81, 85 (1996) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1992)).
51. See Sec. Ltd. v. First Nat'l. Sec. Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1298 (5th Cir.
1985); see also Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 180 (1st Cir.
[Vol. 8: p. 351
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decision in Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece 2 requires that de-
fendant's use of the trademark create a likelihood of confusion in
the minds of potential consumers as to the "source, affiliation, or
sponsorship" of the defendant's mark.5 3 A likelihood of confusion
is "synonymous with probability of confusion, which is more than a
mere possibility of confusion. '54 The non-exhaustive list of factors
considered in determining whether such a likelihood of confusion
exists includes: (1) the type of mark allegedly infringed; (2) the
similarity between the two marks; (3) the similarity of the two prod-
ucts or services; (4) the identity of the retail outlets and purchasers;
(5) the identity of the advertising media used; (6) the defendant's
intent; and (7) any evidence of actual confusion.55 In considering
these "digits of confusion," "[n] o single factor is dispositive; a find-
ing of a likelihood of confusion does not require a positive finding
on a majority of these factors;" and courts may consider additional
relevant factors.56
1993) (holding "once the determination has been made the pivotal inquiry be-
comes whether the allegedly infringing mark is likely to cause consumer
confusion").
52. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998).
53. Id. at 193; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125 (a) (1) (A). "[L]iability for
trademark infringement hinges upon whether a likelihood of confusion exists be-
tween the marks at issue." Soc'y of Fin. Exam'rs v. Nat'l Ass'n of Certified Fraud
Exam'rs, 41 F.3d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Sys.,
Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversing jury's finding of infringement
because likelihood of confusion was "minimal"). "Likelihood of confusion is sy-
nonymous with a probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility of
confusion." Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir.
1989).
54. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d at 193 (citing Blue Bell Bio-Med., 864 F.2d
at 1260). In the Fifth Circuit, the "likelihood of confusion" is a question of fact
subject to review for clear error only. See Moore Bus. Forms, Inc. v. Ryu, 960 F.2d
486, 489 (5th Cir. 1992); see also T.G.I. Friday's, Inc. v. Int'l Rest. Group, Inc., 569
F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1978).
55. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 1, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998);
see also Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d at 194; Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conan's Pizza,
Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1985). Accord Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs.
Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (establishing eight-factor test to determine
likelihood of confusion). The eight factor test considers: the strength of the mark;
the degree of similarity between the two marks; the proximity of the products; the
likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap; actual confusion and the recip-
rocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark; the quality of defen-
dant's product, and the sophistication of the buyers. See id.
56. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664
(5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d at 194, which cited Conan
Properties, Inc., 752 F.2d at 150). The court is also "free to consider other relevant
factors in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists." Id. (citing Armco,
Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1982)).
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C. Dilution
Dilution refers to the diminishing of a trademark's marketing
value. 57 Anti-dilution laws arose to provide legal protection against
another's use of one's trademark on non-competing, unrelated
goods.58 The purpose of anti-dilution laws is not to prevent con-
sumer confusion, but rather to protect a mark owner against the
gradual diluting, or whittling away, of the mark's identity. 59 Just as
a trademark must be "distinctive" in order to receive infringement
protection, anti-dilution laws protect that same distinctiveness while
maintaining the trademark's ability to identify the source of
goods. 60
1. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
PRL claimed dilution of its mark under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(c) (3), the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA"). 61
The FTDA's purpose is to address those situations in which ajunior
user's mark may cause harm to a senior user's mark, even though
the junior mark may not compete directly with the senior user.62
Specifically, the FTDA amends the Lanham Act to codify the pro-
tection available to "famous marks. '63 The FTDA prevents unau-
thorized users from attempting to trade upon the mark holder's
goodwill and established renown in commerce, thereby diminish-
ing the mark's distinctive quality.6
4
57. For an authoritative review of trademark dilution, see generally David S.
Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531 (1991).
58. See Miles J. Alexander, Dilution - A Blessing or a Curse? What Is It? How Do
You Prove It? How Does It Fit in with Traditional Trademark Law?, ALI-ABA Course of
Study: TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND COPYRIGHTS: RECENT DEVELOP-
MENTS AND OTHER SELECTED ISSUES (1994).
59. See Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REv. 813, 825 (1927) (explaining dilution theory envisions another's use of one's
mark as "whittling away or dispersion of the identity . .. of the mark").
60. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030 (stating dilution of distinctiveness is equated with lessening capacity to iden-
tify and distinguish goods). For a discussion of the types of dilution, see infra note
65 and accompanying text.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (1996).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029,
1030 (stating Congress' intent in passing FTDA was to provide uniformity in law by
permitting dilution claims regardless of whether relief was available in state where
suit is brought and provide claimants with nationwide injunctive relief).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (1996) (noting under FTDA, owner of famous
mark is protected "against another person's commercial use ... of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of
the distinctive quality of the mark").
64. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (explaining injunctive relief is typical remedy for dilution
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Like state anti-dilution statutes, the FTDA defines dilution as
the "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and dis-
tinguish goods or services."65  Consequently, "[t]o show dilution,
under the federal law, a plaintiff must prove (1) sufficient similarity
between the junior and senior marks to evoke an instinctive mental
association of the two by a relevant universe of consumers which (2)
has caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's value by
reducing its previous selling power as an advertising agent for its
goods or services. ' 66 "Mere proof that customers would make a
mental association between the marks however, is insufficient to al-
low a plaintiff to prevail."67 Finally, under the FTDA, plaintiff must
show that its mark is "famous" and defendant's use "causes
dilution."68
violation). However, if a willful violation is proven, the remedy may include resti-
tutionary, compensatory or specific relief, including destruction of the offending
articles. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1)-(2), 1117(a), 1118.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1996). Dilution is typically understood to encompass
both blurring and tarnishment. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F.
Supp. 783, 798-99 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (quoting Frank I. Schecter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection, 40 I-bHlv. L. REv. 813, 825 (1927)). Blurring involves "'the
gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon public mind of
the mark or name by its use upon noncompeting goods."' Id. at 799. Tarnish-
ment occurs when one party uses another party's mark in a way that tarnishes or
appropriates the goodwill and reputation associated with the mark. See McCARTHY,
supra note 44 at §§ 24:67-69. This action associates the party's goods with those
known or thought to be of lesser quality. See id. In addition, a mark qualifies for
such protection only if it is famous. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (1996). According
to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), the factors that courts may consider in determining
whether a mark is both famous and distinctive are as follows:
(A) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is
used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom
the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or
the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
66. Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935,
978 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting how much more claimant must demonstrate is sub-
ject to dispute).
67. Id. See also Star Mkts., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1037 (D.
Haw. 1996) (holding that finding of confusion between two marks would not nec-
essarily lead to finding of trademark dilution under FTDA).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
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Currently debate exists as to the requirements of a dilution
claim. The Fourth Circuit requires "actual consummated harm."69
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, requires only proof that
confusion is likely.70
2. Dilution Under Texas State Law
According to Texas law, to succeed in a state dilution claim,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that its mark is distinctive and there
is a likelihood that dilution will follow defendant's use of those
marks. 71 Nonetheless,"' [w]hile the legislative history of the Dilu-
tion Act clearly states that the Act does not preempt existing state
dilution statutes,' one exception to the general rule of non-preemp-
tion, is set out at 43(c) (3) of the Act."72 This section provides that
federal registration of a trademark is a complete defense to state
and common law dilution claims, and the section was included to
encourage federal registration. 73
69. See Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 452 n.6 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that FTDA's legislative
history indicates congressional understanding that dilution results from actual
blurring or tarnishment, i.e. dilution has been proven). See also Robert N. Klieger,
Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection,
58 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 840 (1997) (noting key difference between requirements
of federal dilution act and requirements of its state counterparts). Klieger states
that "[I]n place of the 'likelihood of dilution' language of the state anti-dilution
statutes, the [federal act] . . . creates an actual dilution requirement." Id.
70. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 218 (2d Cir. 1999)
(holding that company established likelihood of success on dilution claim through
showing that famous mark was susceptible to blurring). See also Eli Lilly and Co. v.
Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 852 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (finding likelihood
of confusion).
71. See Exxon Corp. v. Oxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1069, 1081 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding likelihood of dilution); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F.
Supp. 1513, 1567 (S.D. Tex. 1996), affd as modified, 155 F.3d 526 (1998) (finding
likelihood of dilution).
72. LyndaJ. Oswald, Tarnishment and Blurring Under the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act of 1995, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 255, 269-70 (1999).
73. See Hearings on H.R. 1295 Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Mary Ann Alford, Vice President and
Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Reebok International, Ltd. and
Executive Vice President, International Trademark Association). See also 3 McCAR-
THY, supra note 44, § 20:90, at 24-144 and n.26 (explaining Westchester relied
upon this provision and argues that PRL's claim, under the TEx. Bus. & CoM.
CODE § 16.29 is completely barred). The EFDA provides, in pertinent part, that:
The ownership by a person of a valid registration ... on the principal
register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with
respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the com-
mon law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the
distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (1996).
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D. Defenses
In defense of PRL's infringement, dilution and unfair competi-
tion claims, Westchester raises defenses based upon First Amend-
ment rights, as well as laches, acquiescence and incontestability.7 4
1. First Amendment
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
precludes laws restricting freedom of expression. 75 Despite said
Constitutional limitation, "[i] ncidental government restrictions on
expression . . . do not violate the First Amendment."7 6 Courts,
therefore, must balance the competing interests of the speaker's
First Amendment rights and the government's need to regulate the
affected expression when deciding whether government action un-
duly restricts freedom of speech. 77 Differing types of speech carry
different degrees of constitutional protection. 78 The Supreme
Court for example has established that obscene expression and ex-
pression inciting lawless activity receive no protection; while politi-
cal expression on the other hand receives great protection.7 9 The
Section 1125(c) (3) encourages the federal registration of trademarks and furthers
the purpose of the Lanham Act by protecting registered marks from state law inter-
ference. See JEROME GILSON, 2 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE
§ 5.12[1] [c] [v], at 5-267 (1974) (current through May 1999); see also 3 McCARTHY,
supra note 44, § 24-90, at 24-144 and n.26 (citing House Report 104-374 (Nov. 30,
1995)). While section 1125(c) (3) provides an absolute defense to dilution claims
based on state law, it has no impact on dilution claims that are based on federal
law. See GILSON, supra, § 1.12[1] [c] [v], at 5-267; see also 3 McCARTHY, supra note 44,
§ 24-90, at 24-144. See also Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 891
n.8 (8th Cir. 1998).
74. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 981-1010 (S.D. Tex. 1999), affd in part, rev'd in part 214 F.3d 658, 668-69 (5th
Cir. 2000). For further discussion of available defenses, see infra notes 75-109 and
accompanying text.
75. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id. However,
the Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment prohibits only
government action that unduly restricts freedom of expression. See, e.g., Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
76. Arlen W. Langvardt, Protected Marks and Protected Speech: Establishing the
First Amendment Boundaries in Trademark Parody Cases, 36 VILL. L. REv. 1, 48 (1991).
77. See id. See also L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33-34
(1st Cir. 1987) (finding parody of Bean's catalogue is protected expression); Rob-
ert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Ratio-
nales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 197 (1982).
78. See Langvardt, supra note 76, at 48 (citing Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-60 (1985) (suggesting that not all
speech is valued equally for First Amendment purposes).
79. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1972) (holding that mailing of unsolic-
ited sexually explicit material not protected by First Amendment). Indecent ex-
pression, unlike obscene expression, is generally protected. See, e.g., Sable Coin-
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Supreme Court however has also noted that "[o] ur cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, eco-
nomic, literary, or ethical matters .. . is not entitled to full First
Amendment Protection." 80
a. Commercial Speech v. Non-Commercial Speech
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that "commercial
speech" is protected by the Constitution's First Amendment "free
speech" clause.81 The Supreme Court consistently has held that
false or misleading commercial speech is not constitutionally insu-
lated from appropriate regulation. 82 With regard to such false or
misleading commercial speech, the Supreme Court found that
munications Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989) (noting sale of "dial-a-porn"
messages to adults cannot be criminalized because indecent). Speech designed to
incite or is likely to incite criminal activity is not protected. See id.; see also Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding highly protected political speech
includes expression regarding the workings of government, major social and pub-
lic policy issues and persons connected with these matters); Tex. v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 403-06 (1989) (holding flag burning as expressive action representing
political speech); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (noting First
Amendment protects socio-political speech to require that public figures and offi-
cials prove "actual malice" to recover for tortious expression); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (stating First Amendment protects political
speech made by corporate representatives on corporation's behalf that criticize
proposed legislation); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (hold-
ing First Amendment protects criticism of public officials without malice).
80. Abbood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977) (holding First
Amendment principles prohibited union and Board of Education from condition-
ing employment as public school teacher upon teacher's contribution to and sup-
port of ideological cause that she might oppose).
81. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (holding that ordinary advertising of commercial products is as
deserving of Constitutional protection as political speech or writing).
82. See id. The Constitution does not prohibit courts from "insuring that the
stream of commercial information flows cleanly as well as freely." Id. Further, the
Supreme Court has noted, "the government may ban forms of communication
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it." Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). At times, the Supreme
Court has been remarkably indulgent in permitting regulation in cases where ad-
vertising has been only arguably misleading. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 18
(1978) (holding possibility of deception through use or trade names suffices for
state to forbid their use). The Court however has rejected adopting the "poten-
tially misleading" standard as the basis for banning certain types of advertising. See
Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l. Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146-47 (1994) (hold-
ing state did not show that "CPA" and "CFP" designations in attorney advertising
would actually or potentially mislead public). Specifically, the Court has stated
that "[w]e cannot allow rote invocation of the words 'potentially misleading' to
supplant the Board's burden to 'demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.'" Id. See also Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm., 496 U.S. 91, 106 (1990) (explain-
ing that attorney's use of designation "Certified Trial Specialist by The National
Board of Trial Advocacy" was neither actually nor potentially misleading, hence,
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" [t] he government may ban forms of communication more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it. '8 3 As Justice Blackmun stated,
"[a] listener has little interest in receiving false, misleading, or de-
ceptive commercial information."8 4 False or misleading commer-
cial speech therefore, is not protected by the First Amendment and
may be abridged or prohibited completely.8 5
In an action for trademark infringement, where confusion is
likely, the First Amendment does not affect enforcement of trade-
mark rights.86 As such, freedom of speech is not absolute because
First Amendment freedom is balanced against competing govern-
mental interests and policies.87 With respect to certain types of
speech, the freedom of speech yields to other interests. 88 PRL's ef-
forts to prevent Westchester from using "POLO" as the title of its
literary work creates a clash between trademark protection and First
Amendment rights. 89
insufficient to justify categorical ban on disclosure of certification by non-bar
agency).
83. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570 (holding that because First Amendment's
concern for commercial speech is based on informational function of advertising,
there can be no constitutional objection to suppression of commercial messages
that do not accurately inform public about lawful activity).
84. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 425 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (reiterating his position in Central Hudson). In Central Hudson, Justice
Blackmun stated that "intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for a restraint on com-
mercial speech designed to protect consumers from misleading or coercive
speech, or a regulation related to the time, place, or manner of commercial
speech," while non-coercive commercial speech concerning lawful activities is enti-
tled to full First Amendment protection. 447 U.S. at 570.
85. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) ("truthful advertising related to
lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment .... Mislead-
ing advertising may be prohibited entirely.").
86. See 2 GILSON, supra note 73, at 5, 173-74. Concerning commercial speech,
the threshold inquiry is whether the speech is found to be a lawful activity and not
misleading. See id. If so, the court must determine whether the governmental in-
terest asserted is substantial. See id. If the interest is, the court must consider
whether the regulation at issue will advance that governmental interest. See id.
87. See id. (explaining individual freedom of speech must be restricted occa-
sionally for public benefit).
88. See id. See also Langvardt, supra note 76, at 48, 51-52, 55-60 (discussing
circumstances under which government may regulate or restrict certain forms of
expression without violating First Amendment).
89. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d at 664.
"PRL is not trying to enjoin a purely commercial use of the 'Polo' mark. Rather it
is trying to prevent Westchester from using 'Polo' as a title for a magazine. In so
doing, PRL's infringement claim implicates the First Amendment right to choose
an appropriate tide for literary works." Id.
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b. First Amendment and Trademark Protection
Typically, in support of a trademark infringement claim, a
plaintiff only needs to establish a likelihood of confusion to estab-
lish the case.90 When a plaintiff attempts to control or affect the
use of a word however, this action implicates the First Amendment
right to choose an appropriate title for literary works.91 In Rogers v.
Grimaldi,9 2 the Second Circuit ruled that the tension between the
protection afforded by the Lanham Act to trademark owners and
the protection afforded by the First Amendment to expressive activ-
ity could not be resolved by allowing the First Amendment to insu-
late titles of artistic works from Lanham Act claims. 93 Courts other
than the Second Circuit, however, could not ignore First Amend-
ment concerns when enforcing the Lanham Act.9 4
Finding that "overextension of Lanham Act restrictions in the
area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values," courts
construe the Lanham Act narrowly to avoid that conflict.95 For ex-
ample, because titles combine both artistic expression and commer-
cial promotion, the Rogers court held that titles require more First
Amendment protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial
products-commercial speech.9 6 The Second Circuit decided that
"literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act unless the title has no
90. For a discussion of trademark infringement and the "likelihood of confu-
sion" requirement, see supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
91. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664 (citing Sugar Busters LLC v. Bren-
nan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999), which noted First Amendment interest
in choosing appropriate book tide); see also Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l,
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993).
92. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
93. See id. at 998. In Rogers, the Second Circuit found that because "overex-
tension of Lanham Act restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First
Amendment values ... [it] . . . must construe the Lanham Act narrowly to avoid
such conflict." Id. (citing Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 48 (2d Cir. 1989)). See
also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490,
494 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing that if parody conveys that it is original work in-
stead of obviously being parody, it would not only be poor parody but also vulnera-
ble under trademark law due to customer confusion).
94. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 994; see also Silverman v. CBS, 870 F.2d 40, 47-48 (2d
Cir. 1989) (recognizing that in area of artistic speech, enforcement of trademark
fights carries risk of inhibiting free expression); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 (2d
Cir. 1989) (noting, "[Lanham] Act should be construed to apply to artistic works
only where public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs public inter-
est in free expression") (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
95. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664 (citing Rogers, 875 F.2d at 994); see also
Silverman, 870 F.2d at 48; Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494.
96. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 998 (holding although books are indisputably works
of artistic expression and deserve protection, they are sold in commercial market-
places making danger of consumer deception legitimate concern, warranting gov-
ernmental regulation).
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artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work."97
When determining whether an artistically relevant title is mis-
leading (as to the source or content of a work), the Second Circuit
applies the likelihood of confusion test.98 The likelihood of confu-
sion must be "particularly compelling" when First Amendment in-
terests are at stake.99 In 1999, the Fifth Circuit adopted the Second
Circuit's "particularly compelling" standard used in Sugar Busters
L.L.C. v. Brennan.00
2. Laches and Acquiescence
In addition to its First Amendment challenge, Westchester as-
serted the affirmative defenses of laches and acquiescence. 10 1 To
succeed on a laches defense, a defendant must demonstrate
prejudice by showing: "(1) [an] unreasonable delay by one [assert-
ing] legal or equitable rights .. .; and (2) a good faith change of
position by another to his detriment because of the delay."102 Sim-
ply stated, "prejudice ensues when a defendant has changed his po-
sition in a way that would not have occurred if the plaintiff had not
delayed."' 03
97. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d 658, 664 (quoting Twin Peaks Prods. v. Publ'ns
Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993)). See also Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999
("Even where title surpassed appropriately low threshold of minimal artistic rele-
vance but was explicitly misleading as to source or content, violation could be
found.").
98. See Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1379 (applying similar test used in evalu-
ating standard trademark infringement claims).
99. See id. (requiring that "particularly compelling" circumstances exist before
injunction can be issued in view of First Amendment objection).
100. 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying "particularly compelling"
standard to Fifth Circuit cases where trademark and First Amendment rights
conflict).
101. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 668.
102. Exxon Corp. v. Oxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1997)
(citing Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989)). See also
Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conan's Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1985)
("Laches is commonly defined as an inexcusable delay that results in prejudice to
the defendant."); Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161
(5th Cir. 1982) (explaining differing standards for determining unreasonable de-
lay); Envt'l Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1980)
("Equitable remedies are not available if granting the remedy would be inequita-
ble to the defendant because of the plaintiffs long delay.").
103. Conopco, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 95 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
606 F.2d 800, 808 n.17 (8th Cir. 1979)).
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In addition to laches, the defendant can assert the affirmative
defense, acquiescence. To succeed on this affirmative defense, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff implicitly or explicitly as-
sured the defendant so as to justifiably induce the defendant's reli-
ance.10 4 The difference between laches and acquiescence is slight;
"Laches is commonly defined as an inexcusable delay that results in
prejudice to the defendant, ... [while] acquiescence involves the
plaintiff's implicit or explicit assurances to the defendant which in-
duces reliance by the defendant." 10 5 Consequently, to prevail
under the affirmative defense of acquiescence, Westchester must
demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by an assurance, implicit
or explicit, on PRL's part.
3. Incontestability
Westchester also asserted its right to publish the New POLO
Magazine on the basis that the mark had become incontestable. 10 6
Generally, a mark becomes incontestable after five years of continu-
ous use, federal registration and compliance with statutory formali-
ties. 107 Once a mark has achieved incontestable status, "it is
conclusively presumed either that the mark is non-descriptive, or if
descriptive, has acquired a secondary meaning."'1 8 Consequently,
an incontestable mark is rarely subject to challenge. 10 9
104. See Lanham Trade-Mark Act, § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
105. Conan, 752 F.2d at 153 (citing In Re Bohart, 743 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir.
1984)).
106. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 982 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting incontestable defense is Westchester's most con-
vincing defense). Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act provides that an incontestable
registration is conclusive evidence of the exclusive right to use the mark on or in
connection with the goods or services specified in the affidavit filed under the
provisions of section 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1996).
107. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1999).
108. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 44, § 15:35, at 15-53.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b), which facially permits an incontestable mark to
be challenged in the following circumstances:
(1) That the registration ... was obtained fraudulently; or (2) That the
mark has been abandoned by the registrant; or (3) That the registered
mark is being used ... to misrepresent the source of the goods ... in
connection with which the mark is used; or (4) That the use of a name
... charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of
the [alleged infringer's] individual name in his own business .... or of a
term . . . which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith to de-
scribe the [alleged infringer's] goods ... or their geographic origin; (5)
That the [allegedly infringing mark] was adopted without knowledge of
the registrant's prior use and has been continuously used [for a certain
period of time]; (6) That the [allegedly infringing] mark was registered
and used prior to the [infringed mark's] registration; (7) That the mark
is being used to violate the anti-trust laws; (8) That the mark is functional;
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Westchester Media Company L.P. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 110
the Fifth Circuit considered five issues against a clearly erroneous
standard of review."' First, the court considered whether West-
chester infringed upon PRL's "POLO" mark.11 2 Second, the court
considered whether there was substantial proof to support PRL's
trademark dilution claim. 113 The third issue required the court's
consideration of each party's rights, as determined by the protec-
tions of the Lanham Act and the First Amendment. 1 14 The fourth
issue was whether PRL was guilty of laches or acquiescence.' 5 The
fifth issue was whether Westchester could claim the incontestability
of its predecessor's (Fleet Street's) mark. 16
or (9) That equitable principles, including laches, estoppel, and acquies-
cence, are applicable.
Id.
110. 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
111. See id.; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses."). A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the ap-
pellate court, after reviewing the complete record, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. See 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE 206.03 (3d ed. 1999) (citing United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948), which cited FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b); see
also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985) (citing also
FED. R. Cirv. P. 52(b)); Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d
1007, 1011 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that sole woman surrounded by male factory
workers invited sexual harassment was incredible in discrimination action); Mar
Oil, S.A. v. Morrissey, 982 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding in attorney-fee
dispute that plaintiff's attorney logged more time after complex litigation was re-
solved than during litigation was too improbable to believe); United States v. Fid.
Capital Corp., 920 F.2d 827, 840 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding alter ego argument
inconceivable in action by company to recover on debt, since company refused to
release debt over many transactions with purported alter egos); Todd v. Corp. Life
Ins. Co., 945 F.2d 204, 208 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling in breach of employment con-
tract case, that letter could not unilaterally modify contract regarding term, but
inconsistently finding that letter unilaterally modified contract regarding payment
of expenses) (quotations omitted)). A mistake has been committed if the factual
finding seems so improbable as to the belief, is incredible on the admitted facts, is
inconceivable or is internally inconsistent. See id.
112. For a discussion of PRL's trademark infringement claim, see infra notes
119-43 and accompanying text.
113. For a discussion of the issue of dilution, see infra notes 144-53 and ac-
companying text.
114. For a discussion of the issue of suitable remedies, see infra notes 154-79
and accompanying text.
115. For a discussion of Westchester's defenses of laches and acquiescence,
see infra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
116. For a discussion of the incontestability of Westchester's mark, see infra
notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
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The Fifth Circuit concluded that Westchester's magazine,
"POLO," infringed upon PRL's "Polo" mark.117 The court also
held that for PRL to establish a case of dilution, PRL would have to
present proof of (1) actual dilution of its "Polo" mark caused by
Westchester's "POLO" mark; (2) the district court erred in failing
to adequately consider a remedy that would have accommodated
Westchester's First Amendment concerns; (3) PRL was not guilty of
laches or acquiescence; and (4) Westchester could not claim the
incontestability of its predecessor's "POLO" mark.1 18
A. Westchester Infringed Upon PRL's Mark
The Fifth Circuit first considered whether Westchester's use of
the "POLO" mark constituted infringement under the Lanham
Act. 19 On appeal, Westchester first argued that the court improp-
erly applied the "particularly compelling" standard as mandated by
the Fifth Circuit's precedent in Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan.120
Second, Westchester challenged the magistrate's findings on sev-
eral "digits of confusion." 121 Third, Westchester claimed that it had
no intent to infringe upon PRL's mark. 122 Fourth, Westchester
found fault in the court's holding of a similarity between products
because magazines are within PRL's "natural zone of expansion."1 23
Finally, Westchester argued that the 1997 re-launch of the New
POLO Magazine did not result in increased actual confusion.1 24
1. Consideration of the Sugar Busters Standard
The Fifth Circuit began the infringement analysis by consider-
ing Westchester's complaint that the trial court improperly applied
the Sugar Busters, "particularly compelling," standard. 125 Specifi-
cally, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the trial court errone-
117. SeeWestchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 658-
60 (5th Cir. 2000).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 663-66. Although the First Amendment is a consideration in
the infringement claim, Section A specifically deals with infringement, while Sec-
tion C considers the First Amendment considerations in determining a remedy for
the resolution of this conflict. See id.
120. See id. at 665-68 (citing Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258 (5th
Cir. 1999)).
121. See id. In particular, Westchester challenged the district court's findings
on the issues of intent, similarity of products and services and actual confusion. See
id.
122. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 666-67.
123. See id
124. See id. at 667.
125. See id.
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ously found infringement despite Westchester's First Amendment
interests by finding liability on a simple likelihood of confusion. 126
In reviewing the injunction ordered against Westchester, the Fifth
Circuit noted the magistrate's recognition that Sugar Busters "raised
the bar," requiring that "particularly compelling" circumstances ex-
ist before an injunction can be issued despite a First Amendment
objection. 127 Because Westchester's position was to simply attack
the evidence considered in the magistrate's "digits of confusion"
analysis, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that only the likelihood of
confusion, and not the evidence, must be "particularly
compelling."'
28
2. Application of the Digits of Confusion
a. Westchester's Intent
In considering the digits of confusion, the Fifth Circuit began
with Westchester's intent in adopting its "POLO" mark. In particu-
lar, the Fifth Circuit began by recognizing that "[a] n innocent in-
tent in adopting a mark does not immunize an intent to confuse in
the actual use of the mark."'129 The court further recognized the
history that Westchester's ownership has with the sport of polo and
therefore, agreed with the magistrate judge that Goodman did not
purchase the "Polo" mark with intent to trade on PRL's reputation
and goodwill.130 Nonetheless, the court found Westchester's actual
use of the "Polo" mark, in light of its publication of two magazines,
New POLO and Polo Player's Edition, without a convincing expla-
nation for the split, as evidence of an intent to trade on PRL's
reputation. 131
126. See id. at 665.
127. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 665 (citing Westchester Media Co., v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935, 991 (S.D. Tex. 1999)).
128. See id. at 665-66 (citing depiction of standard in Twin Peaks Prods., Inc.
v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir. 1993), as "the finding of likeli-
hood of confusion must be particularly compelling"); see also Sugar Busters LLC v.
Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (requiring "particularly compel-
ling" likelihood to cause confusion before First Amendment interests will be over-
come); Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1379 (holding "the finding of likelihood of
confusion must be particularly compelling to outweigh the First Amendment
interest").
129. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 666 (citing Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v.
Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 203 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 22 cmt. c (1995)).
130. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 666.
131. See id. The Fifth Circuit noted the magistrate judge's review of evidence,
including magazine covers, editorial and advertising content and customer surveys.
See id. This evidence demonstrated that New POLO Magazine's primary focus is
affluent lifestyles, fashion and travel rather than the sport of polo. See id. The fact
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b. Similarity of Products and Services
Even though Ralph Lauren publishes no magazines or periodi-
cals, the Fifth Circuit supported the magistrate's decision on the
issue of similarity of products and services, finding that magazines
are within PRL's "natural zone of expansion."1 32 In the absence of
direct competition, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the magistrate
judge that "consumer perception is the issue. '13 3 In comparing
PRL's strong presence in the fashion and merchandise industry
with New POLO Magazine's emphasis on fashion, elegance and af-
fluent lifestyles, the court found no clear error in finding that con-
sumers would perceive an inherent connection between PRL and
New POLO Magazine.134 The court also found Westchester's mar-
keting strategies, including the focus on consumers in the same
context, to be persuasive. 135 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, held that
the record indicated no clear error in the district court's finding
that the likelihood of confusion was "particularly compelling."'3 6
that Westchester published both New POLO Magazine and Polo Player's Edition
demonstrates the split of the lifestyle content from the technical polo content. See
id. The magistrate judge also found this split to demonstrate intent to profit from
the lifestyle image already established by PRL's "Polo" mark. See id. Westchester's
alternative explanations for this split were found unconvincing to the magistrate
judge. See id.
132. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 953 (clarifying that competi-
tion is not necessary for confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 21(e), cmt. j (1995) (establishing danger of affiliation or sponsorship
confusion increases when junior user's marker is one into which senior user would
naturally expand); see also Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505
(5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "the greater the similarity between products and ser-
vices, the greater the likelihood of confusion"). But see Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d
at 202 (explaining that direct competition between parties' products is not re-
quired in order to find likelihood of confusion, but when products or services are
non-competing, confusion at issue is one of sponsorship, affiliation or
connection).
133. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 667; see also Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d at
202 (explaining "[i]f consumers believe, even though falsely, that the natural ten-
dency of producers of the type for goods marketed by the prior user is to expand
into the market of the type of goods marketed by the subsequent user, confusion
may be likely.") (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt.
j (1995)).
134. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 666-67. The clear error standard per-
mits the reversal of the district court's holding only if it has a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed." Id. at 665 (quoting B.H. Bunn Co.
v. AAA Replacement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1971)).
135. See id. at 667-68 (supporting magistrate judge's findings that, inter alia,
New POLO Magazine and PRL's products target same consumers and occasionally
use same retail outlets). Furthermore, New POLO Magazine's emphasis on fash-
ion, affluent lifestyle and travel can plausibly lead consumers to believe that PRL is
associated with the New POLO Magazine. See id.
136. See id. (finding no "definite and firm conviction that a mistake ha[d]
been committed," which accords with requirements of B.H. Bunn Co. v. AAA Re-
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c. Actual Confusion
Westchester challenged the results of PRL's survey and argued
clear error in the district court's finding that the 1997 re-launch of
New POLO resulted in an increase in incremental confusion.
1 3 7
Westchester claimed that PRL's survey was faulty because the survey
did not distinguish between actionable confusion produced by the
New POLO Magazine and permissible confusion attributable to the
Old POLO Magazine.1 3 8 Although the Fifth Circuit found that Old
POLO Magazine may have been a more effective control than using
Polo Player's Edition, the court also found that Polo Player's Edi-
tion to be "not so different from the Old POLO Magazine as to
make it clearly erroneous to rely on PRL's survey." 139 The court's
concern was the level of actual confusion in the current market-
place as "today's consumers are exposed to Polo Player's Edition,
not the Old POLO Magazine. '1 40 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
found that the two magazines define the difference between per-
missive and actionable confusion.1 4 1 Finding no clear error in ana-
lyzing the challenged digits of confusion, the Fifth Circuit upheld
the magistrate's finding of a likelihood of confusion between New
POLO Magazine and the PRL marks. 142
placement Parts Co., 451 F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
137. See id. at 667. Westchester attacks PRL's survey on the grounds that its
control factor was faulty. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 965-66.
138. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 667. Westchester argues that the survey
should have used the Old POLO Magazine as a control rather than POLO Player's
Edition to effectively isolate the variable at issue, the change in the look of the re-
launched magazine, as opposed to the name. See id. In using Polo Player's Edition
as a control however, the name of the magazine was admitted into the survey as
another variable, meaning that the one variable at issue, the look of the magazine,
could not be isolated. See id. The incremental confusion solely attributable to the
magazine's new look could not therefore be determined, and some of the incre-
mental confusion could have been attributed to the different names, Polo Player's
Edition and POLO. See id.
139. Id. (explaining that although Old POLO Magazine would have provided
for better study control group than Polo Player's Edition, this did not constitute
clear error).
140. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 667.
141. See id.
142. See id. "Westchester left unchallenged: the type of mark infringed (strong),
the similarity between the two marks, the identity of the retail outlets and purchas-
ers, and the identity of the advertising media used." Id. at 667 n.6. The district
court and Fifth Circuit found the question of whether Westchester's magazine title
is artistically relevant to its content as moot. See id. Although the New POLO con-
tains articles on fashion and travel, it remains the official publication of the USPA
and contains articles specifically related to polo, including sections dedicated to
tournaments, polo players and personalities. See id. The Fifth Circuit found that
Westchester was appealing the district court's decision because it was not a model
2002] 373
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Because the court found support in the record of the magis-
trate judge's holding as to the "particularly compelling likelihood
of confusion," Westchester's only remaining hope would be
through a successful defense. 143
B. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
In addition to infringement, PRL declared dilution of its
"Polo" mark.144 As the Fifth Circuit had not yet addressed the stan-
dards governing relief under the FTDA and PRL requested the
same relief under both its dilution claims as that ordered in the
infringement action, after finding infringement the district court
declined to rule on the issue of dilution.145 Additionally, finding
that PRL's Texas state law dilution claim was pre-empted by West-
chester's federal registration of its "POLO" mark, the magistrate
did not consider the state dilution claim's merits either.146 Since
the magistrate's ruling on PRL's state law dilution claim was unchal-
lenged by both parties, the ruling was left undisturbed by the Fifth
Circuit.14 7 In finding that PRL's dilution claim under the FTDA
could establish another basis for mark holders to seek equitable re-
lief, the court chose to address the dilution issue.148
The Fifth Circuit ruled that in order to prevail on the dilution
claim, PRL had to prove that (1) its marks were famous and distinc-
tive; (2) Westchester's mark was adopted after PRL's had become
famous and distinctive; and (3) Westchester's use of its "Polo" mark
"caused dilution" of PRL's "Polo" mark. 49 As the parties did not
contest the first two of these issues, their dispute focused upon
whether proof of dilution requires a showing of actual or merely
of clarity. See id. The district court did recognize, however, that Sugar Busters had
"raised the bar" and that "particularly compelling" circumstances did exist. See id.
Therefore, Westchester's argument was based only upon the clarity of the decision,
which followed the Sugar Busters standard in substance. See id. at 665.
143. See id. at 668. The district court's finding of a likelihood of confusion
was supplemented by evidence of actual confusion, both anecdotal and survey-
based, as well as its finding of Westchester's intent to trade on PRL's goodwill and
reputation. See id. at 666-68.
144. See id. at 669. PRL alleges dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3), the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act. For a discussion of the Federal Trademark Dilu-
tion Act, see supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
145. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (noting that decisions in
Fifth Circuit addressing claims of dilution avoided analysis of FTDA).
146. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669 n.10.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 669.
149. See id. at 670 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), 1127 and Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449,
452 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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threatened economic harm. 150 Finding that proof of actual harm
harmonizes with the plain meaning of the statute, the Fifth Circuit
endorsed and adopted that requirement as an issue of first impres-
sion.1 5 ' Because PRL made no showing of actual harm, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the district court's position, rejecting PRL's dilution
claim. 152 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit adopted the requirement
that plaintiffs prove actual harm in claims under the FTDA. 153 Hav-
ing discounted the dilution claim, the only remaining issue in this
case surrounded the appropriate remedy for Westchester's trade-
mark infringement.
C. The First Amendment's Effect on a Remedy
In addressing the inherent First Amendment conflict in this
case, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that while "[i]n the usual Lan-
ham Act case, the presence of a likelihood of confusion disposes of
the issue of infringement... this case [therefore] is not so simple,"
even with the "particularly compelling" standard. 154 The Fifth Cir-
cuit recognized that in PRL's attempt to enjoin Westchester's com-
mercial use of the "POLO" mark, the claim implicated the First
Amendment right to choose an appropriate title for literary
works.155 In doing so, the court addressed the clash between the
protections afforded by the Lanham Act to trademark owners and
the protection afforded by the First Amendment to expressive
activity.156
150. See id. For the Fifth Circuit, dilution under the FTDA is an issue of first
impression. See id. Westchester relies on a Fourth Circuit opinion, Ringling Bros.,
170 F.3d at 464, in asserting that the proof of dilution under the FTDA requires
proof of "actual, consummated harm." Id. at 670. Accord Kuester & Nieves, supra
note 46, at 247-51 (examining federal trademark infringement cases). PRL con-
tests this assertion with the support of a Second Circuit opinion holding that FTDA
requires only proof of a likelihood of dilution. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing to limit application of statute to
dilution that has already occurred).
151. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670 (explaining that there is key differ-
ence between state anti-dilution statutes that formed backdrop for FTDA and
FTDA itself because state statutes require likelihood of confusion and federal stat-
ute requires proof); see also Klieger, supra note 69 at 840 (explaining that FTDA
replaces language requiring likelihood of confusion with actual dilution
requirement).
152. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 671.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 664.
155. See id.
156. See id. (noting Sugar Busters LLC v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1999) (explaining First Amendment interest in choosing appropriate book
title)); Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir.
1993) ("the finding of likelihood of confusion must be particularly compelling").
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Agreeing that titles combine both artistic expression and com-
mercial promotion, the Fifth Circuit found that titles require
greater First Amendment protection than the labeling of ordinary
commercial products. 157 As such, courts must balance the need for
injunctive relief with the need to protect free expressive speech. 158
In determining a proper remedy in light of such First Amendment
considerations, courts apply the 'least restrictive alternative' rule
and order the narrowest appropriate remedy. 159 When a First
Amendment issue is at stake, courts construe the Lanham Act nar-
rowly while also recognizing that the First Amendment does not
give one license to "infringe on the rights" of others. 160
In considering the district court's broad injunction, ordering
Westchester to cease publication of New POLO Magazine under
the name "POLO," the Fifth Circuit found that the lower court im-
properly disregarded Westchester's First Amendment interests.' 61
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's finding
that PRL's rights need not yield to First Amendment concerns be-
cause Westchester had alternative avenues of communication avail-
able.162 The "other avenue" was for Westchester to publish its
157. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664.
158. See McCARTHY, supra note 44 at 27:69 (explaining need to consider First
Amendment in determining most appropriate remedy).
159. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664. See also In Re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191,
203 (1982) ("Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States
may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive ... restrictions upon such advertising may be no broader than reasona-
bly necessary to prevent the deception."); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (holding that in commercial
speech context, First Amendment mandates that speech constraints remain as nar-
row as possible and not completely suppress information when narrower restric-
tions on expression would serve a legitimate interest as well).
160. See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding trial court's issuance of injunction prohibiting designer from using insur-
ance company's trademarks as logos or to market, advertise or identify his prd-
ucts did not violate designer's First Amendment rights, where other avenues to
express his views existed and were unrestricted by injunction).
161. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 550 (5th Cir.
1998). In reviewing injunctive relief in trademark cases, the Fifth Circuit applied
the abuse of discretion standard. See id.
162. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664. The Fifth Circuit precedent holds
that, just like injunctive relief generally, an equitable remedy for trademark in-
fringement should be no broader than necessary to prevent the deception. See
Peaches Entm't Corp. v. Entm't Repertoire Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690, 693 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that abuse of discretion automatically inheres in injunctive decree
if trial court misinterpreted applicable law); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus.,
Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that equitable remedy for trade-
mark infringement should be no broader than necessary to prevent deception).
The magistrate judge, therefore, too hastily followed the case of Reddy Communi-
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magazine under another title. 163 The Fifth Circuit found this ave-
nue too harsh since the district court failed to exhaustively consider
all other possible remedies.1 64 In failing to explore all possible
remedies, the district court improperly labeled Westchester's title as
"commercial speech."' 65 On the contrary, the Fifth Circuit recog-
nized that a magazine title is a hybrid between commercial and ar-
tistic speech. 16 6
Because the Fifth Circuit found Westchester's infringing
speech to be at least partly literary or artistic, and not simply a com-
mercial use of PRL's mark, the court needed to eliminate the likeli-
hood of confusion, while accommodating Westchester's First
Amendment interests. 167 In doing so, the court noted that dis-
claimers have served to satisfy that purpose in similar situations. 168
The court explained that "[1]ike fraudulent speech, speech that
cations, Inc. v. Env't Action Found., Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 634 (D.D.C. 1977), and
dismissed Westchester's First Amendment concerns in concluding that the rights
of a trademark owner need not yield to First Amendment concerns "where a de-
fendant has alternative avenues of communication available." Westchester Media,
214 F.3d at 671 (quoting Westchester Media Co., v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 990 (S.D. Tex. 1999)) (citing Reddy Communications, 199 U.S.P.Q.
630, 634 (D.D.C. 1977)). Here, Westchester's alternative avenue is to publish the
lifestyle magazine under any title other than POLO. See id. The Fifth Circuit re-jected the Reddy Communications approach and held that even where trademark
infringement has been found, First Amendment interests should influence the
choice of remedy. See id. at 672 (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.,
811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing importance of First Amendment in fash-
ioning appropriate remedy for infringement)).
163. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 671-72. (citing Westchester Media Co., 103
F. Supp. 2d at 990) (following, Reddy Communications, Inc., 199 U.S.P.Q. 630, 634
(holding that First Amendment rights do not give license to infringe upon others'
trademark rights); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d at 402 ("the First Amend-
ment does not give [one party] license to infringe the rights of [another party]");
and Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property.")).
164. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 671-72 (addressing Fifth Circuit's deci-
sion in Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. Med. Dirs., Inc., 681 F.2d
397, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1982), which reviewed scope of injunction for compliance
with First Amendment).
165. See id. at 672 (citing Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 989). By
labeling the magazine title as commercial speech, the district court provided less
First Amendment protection than afforded to artistic speech. See id.
166. See id. (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989), hold-
ing that speech contained in magazine is more expressive than ordinary commer-
cial speech; therefore, requires more protection than labeling of typical
commercial products).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 672 (noting that disclaimers had been used in Better Bus. Bureau,
681 F.2d at 405; Consumers Union, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053
(2d Cir. 1983); Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at 1379 (2d Cir. 1993); and even in
district court's preliminary injunction).
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misleads or creates confusion is not protected under the First
Amendment."1 69 Because the infringing speech was found to be at
least partly literary or artistic, not solely a commercial appropria-
tion of PRL's mark, the Fifth Circuit decided to consider the use of
a disclaimer as a possible trademark remedy. 170 The Fifth Circuit
concluded its analysis with a four-fold explanation for favoring a
disclaimer over the broad injunction imposed by the district
court.
1 7 1
The first reason why a disclaimer might provide a more appro-
priate remedy stems from the "undisputed [fact] that Westchester
has the right to publish some magazine under the title POLO.1 72
Recognizing this, the Fifth Circuit found the district court's reme-
dial injunction, prohibiting the New POLO Magazine to focus on
fashion and lifestyles, as being potentially effective. 173 At the same
time, imposing editorial constrictions upon the New POLO Maga-
zine would pose a constant threat that one other than Westchester
would regulate the "speech content of Westchester's magazine,
169. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672 (citing Better Bus. Bureau, 681 F.2d at
404). On this basis, the court explained that because the purpose of a remedy for
trademark infringement is to eliminate the likelihood of confusion between the
holder of the mark and the imposter, the remedy could, in some cases, require
suppression of otherwise constitutionally protected speech. See id.; see also Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.
1997) (enjoining production of parody of Dr. Seuss' "The Cat in the Hat"); Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.
1979) (holding that First Amendment rights were not encroached upon because
numerous ways to comment without infringing trademark existed).
170. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672. The court noted that it and others
have frequently approved disclaimers when trademark and First Amendment inter-
ests overlap. See id. See, e.g., Better Bus. Bureau, 681 F.2d at 404 (noting that trade-
mark infringement remedies cannot restrain dissemination of accurate, factual
information); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1053
(2d Cir. 1983) (preferring disclaimers over total prohibitions); Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc., 996 F.2d at 1379 (remanding to determine if there is any possibility disclaimer
will suffice). The court stressed that courts in trademark cases have a responsibility
to tailor the relief to the violation and this responsibility includes the considera-
tion of disclaimers. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 672. Courts disallowing dis-
claimers have done so only after a fact specific conclusion that they would be
ineffective. See id. at 672 n.19. See, e.g., Boston Prof'l Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1013 (5th Cir. 1975) ("Only a prohibi-
tion of the unauthorized will sufficiently remedy the wrong."). Courts have not
defeated the use of disclaimers where they would be effective to accommodate
conflicting legal principles. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g,
Inc., 687 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1982) (disallowing disclaimer only after exhaustive
analysis of other remedies that would more sufficiently accommodate applicable
First Amendment interests).
171. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 673-74.
172. Id. at 673 (noting that Westchester bought Fleet Street's rights to incon-
testable mark).
173. See id.
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which is not permissible under the First Amendment."1 74 In other
words, "It]he content-based impact of [that] injunction could ex-
tend beyond the title of Westchester's magazine, posing special
First Amendment concerns.
17 5
The second reason why the Fifth Circuit favored a disclaimer is
that PRL was essentially claiming the right to dictate the use of the
"Polo" mark by the publisher of the USPA's official magazine. 176
The Fifth Circuit explained that PRL became famous through asso-
ciating itself with the sport of polo and now asserts that it has rights
to the name that extend beyond those of the sport. 77 The court
found that this result would be unjust.
Third, the Fifth Circuit favored disclaimer relief because after
the district court's preliminary injunction requiring a disclaimer,
consumer confusion was no longer apparent. 178 Finally, the court
favored a disclaimer because both PRL's products and Westches-
ter's magazine catered to relatively sophisticated consumers. 179
Such consumers, as a class, are considered to be more likely to no-
tice, read and understand the written disclaimer's significance.180
174. Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935,
989 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (citing Docket Entry # 188, at 4). But see Centaur Communi-
cations, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1229-30 (2d Cir.
1987) (affirming injunctive relief for infringing trademark in tide of publication);
Am. Ass'n for Advancement of Sci. v. Hearst Corp., 498 F. Supp. 244, 264-65
(D.D.C. 1980) (demonstrating that while order to cease publication under particu-
lar name is rare circumstance, it has been held best course of action when there is
no adequate remedy at law). For discussions of First Amendment concerns, see
Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting
First Amendment interest in choosing appropriate book title); Twin Peaks Prods.,
Inc., 996 F.2d at 1379 (2d Cir. 1993) (requiring "particularly compelling" likeli-
hood of confusion before First Amendment interests will be overcome).
175. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 673.
176. See id.
177. See id. The Fifth Circuit found:
PRL products became famous by basking in the reflected glow of an ele-
gant sport. PRL now asserts that it, not the sport, is the source of that
glow. While PRL's primary claim is the essence of the ordinary trade-
mark case, we cannot be blind, when balancing the equities, to the fact
that PRL is arrogating the very name of a sport from the players' publica-
tion. In a sense, PRL is biting the hand that fed it.
Id.
178. See id. The magistrate judge speculated that the absence of confusion
was due to publicity surrounding the present case rather than disclaimers. See id.
However, PRL provided no evidence of actual confusion. See id. The Fifth Circuit
found that on remand, both parties would have the opportunity to establish the
presence or absence of confusion. See id.
179. See id. at 674 (citing Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d
1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987), which explained presence of sophisticated consumers
weighs in favor of disclaimer relief).
180. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 674 (citing Times Mirror Magazines,
Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 168-69 (3d Cir. 2000) reason-
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The Fifth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court on the issue
of liability but vacated and remanded the case for determination of
whether a disclaimer would afford a more appropriate remedy.' 8 '
D. Westchester's Defenses
Westchester based its defenses on theories of laches, acquies-
cence and the incontestability of its trademark. 8 2
1. Laches
The defense of laches is defined as "an inexcusable delay that
results in prejudice to the defendant."'8 3 Laches contains three ele-
ments: "(1) delay in asserting one's trademark rights, (2) lack of
excuse for the delay, and (3) undue prejudice to the alleged in-
fringer caused by the delay."' 8 4 Westchester challenged the trial
court's finding that none of these elements were established.18 5
The Fifth Circuit upheld the magistrate's finding that no delay ex-
isted because Ralph Lauren had no complaints with the Old POLO
Magazine.' 8 6 PRL claimed the New POLO Magazine was "an en-
tirely new product and different from the Old POLO Magazine in
most respects."' 8 7 The Fifth Circuit also found that the four
months, which elapsed between the June meeting and PRL's regis-
tered objections in its cease and desist letter, were not an unreason-
able amount of time in which to assert PRL's rights.a8 8 Finally, the
ing that "[u]nsophisticated buyers.., are more vulnerable to confusion, mistake,
and misassociations against which the trademark protects").
181. See id. at 675.
182. For a complete discussion of Westchester's defense of laches, see infra
notes 183-89. For a complete discussion of Westchester's defense of acquiescence,
see infra notes 190-93. For a complete discussion of Westchester's defense of trade-
mark incontestability, see infra notes 194-99.
183. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 668. See also Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford
Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1082 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Rogers v. Ricane Enters.,
Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989)). See also Conan Props., Inc. v. Conan's Pizza,
Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing application of laches and acqui-
escence in one locale to another locale); Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co.,
693 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982) (describing analysis as factual calculation for
trial court); Envt'l Def. Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1980)
(outlining criteria for defense of laches).
184. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 668 (citing Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v.
Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 205 (5th Cir. 1998)).
185. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 997-98 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
186. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 668.
187. Id.
188. See id.
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court did not find that this delay prejudiced Westchester in any
way.' 89
2. Acquiescence
Westchester asserted acquiescence based on PRL's failure to
object to the re-launch efforts at the June 1997 meeting. 190 West-
chester claimed that PRL's response constituted an implicit assur-
ance and as such, justifiably induced reliance. 191 The Fifth Circuit,
however, found Westchester's acquiescence contention unpersua-
sive because Westchester had not raised a challenge to the trial
court's finding that it misled PRL's representative about the extent
of the new venture. 192 Having found that Westchester misled PRL,
any assurance by PRL would not be legally actionable. 193
3. Incontestability
The Fifth Circuit found Westchester's assertion that § 33(b) of
the Lanham Act makes its registration for the mark "POLO" on or
in connection with its "magazine on the subject of equestrian sports
and lifestyles" to be presumptuous. 194 Specifically, the court found
that Westchester assumed that the purchased registration would
cover both the Old and New POLO Magazine. 95 Although 15
U.S.C. § 1115(b) provides that a mark becomes incontestable
through five years of continuous use following federal registration
189. See id. at 668 n.7. With regard to the magistrate's finding of no undue
prejudice in light of Westchester's losses, amounting to $1.3 million, the Fifth Cir-
cuit found that PRL cannot be held responsible for Westchester's investment prior
to learning about the planned launch of the New POLO Magazine. See id. Fur-
thermore, any such investment made following PRL's objection was made at West-
chester's own risk. See id. Similarly, in Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188
(5th Cir. 1998), the court remarked that "[a]ny acts after receiving a cease and
desist letter are at the defendant's own risk because it is on notice of the plaintiffs
objection to such acts." Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d at 198.
190. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99, (referring to June 23,
1997 meeting between Westchester's Reid Slaughter with PRL advertising execu-
tive, Elizabeth Morris).
191. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 668 (citing Conan Properties, Inc. v.
Conan's Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1985).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 668. See also Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 998-99
(finding that Elizabeth Morris was misled as to extent of project).
194. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669 (explaining that Westchester's in-
contestability argument presumes that official PTO registration, purchased from
Fleet Street, similarly covers both Old and New POLO Magazine).
195. See id. at 669. Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act provides that an incon-
testable registration is conclusive evidence of the exclusive right to use the mark
on or in connection with the goods or services specified in the affidavit filed under
the provisions of section 15. See id.
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and statutory compliance, the court found the issue unnecessary to
address.196 In relying on the factual finding that the Old POLO
Magazine and New POLO Magazine are different products, the
court rejected Westchester's incontestability argument.19 7 Conse-
quently, the statutory minimum of five years required to establish
incontestability had not been satisfied.198 The Fifth Circuit noted,
therefore, that the incontestability of the mark as applied to Old
POLO Magazine did not shield New POLO Magazine from attack
as "[t]he incontestable 'Polo' mark was used to title a magazine
about the sport of polo, and cannot be transferred to a fundamen-
tally different magazine."'199
V. CRITIcAL ANALYsIs
In Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that Westchester Media in-
fringed upon PRL's trademark rights. 20 0 At the same time, the
court recognized that Westchester, as the publisher of the USPA's
official magazine, had a right to publish a magazine entitled
"POLO."20 1 Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's
finding that Westchester infringed upon PRL's trademark. 20 2 At
the same time however, the Fifth Circuit also found that issuing a
broad injunction, requiring Westchester to focus the magazine on
the sport as in Polo Player's Edition, was too great a penalty.20 3 The
court therefore, remanded the case for a determination of whether
a disclaimer, disavowing any affiliation between "POLO" Magazine
196. See id. Because the district court found that the Old "POLO" Magazine
and the New "POLO" were essentially different, the incontestable registration did
not apply to the New "POLO" Magazine. See id.
197. See id. (noting that while both magazines fit literal description of regis-
tered mark, applying § 1115 of Lanham Act would ignore district court's finding
that two magazines are not same product). "A federal registration does not create
the trademark; the trademark is acquired by use." Id. (citing 3 MCCARTHY, supra
note 44, at § 19:3 and Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Wheeler, 814 F.2d
812, 819 (1st Cir. 1987)).
198. See id. Westchester argued that New POLO, like its predecessor, satisfies
the description of a "magazine on the subject of equestrian sports and lifestyles."
Id. However, such an application of § 1115 ignores the magistrate's finding that
the two magazines are different products. See id.
199. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669.
200. Id. at 660.
201. See id. (recognizing Westchester's incontestable registration of "POLO"
mark). For additional background concerning the ramifications of a mark's in-
contestability and its significance in this case, see supra notes 15, 106, 109, 169, 193
and accompanying text.
202. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 660.
203. See id. (finding that such restriction was not narrowest restriction upon
Westchester's First Amendment right).
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and PRL, would serve as a more appropriate remedy. 20 4 In so do-
ing, the court recognized PRL's right to the "POLO" mark in the
fashion and lifestyles industry, while also recognizing Westchester's
right to appropriately title its literary works and control the maga-
zine's substance. 20 5 The Fifth Circuit decided the case
appropriately.
The court properly found that the likelihood of confusion be-
tween Westchester's New POLO Magazine and PRL's "POLO" mark
was "particularly compelling."20 6 Just as the district court found a
likelihood of confusion, the Fifth Circuit determined that the find-
ings similarly supported a "particularly compelling" likelihood of
confusion. 20 7 The "particularly compelling" standard, as derived
from Rogers208 and adopted in Sugar Busters,20 9 recognizes that
"[1] iterary titles do not violate the Lanham Act 'unless the title has
no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has
some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work.' '2 1 0
In assessing whether the "particularly compelling" standard
had been satisfied, the Fifth Circuit considered the district court's
application of the digits of confusion. 211 The district court found a
particularly compelling likelihood of confusion. 212 Absent clear er-
ror, in light of the inapplicability of Westchester's two affirmative
defenses, the finding of infringement was proper.
In considering the issue of dilution under the FTDA, the Fifth
Circuit held, as an issue of first impression, that a violation of the
204. See id.
205. See id.
206. See Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, 177 F.3d 258, 269 n.7 (5th Cir.
1999) (holding that any finding that defendants' book title is likely to cause confu-
sion with plaintiff's book title must be "particularly compelling" to outweigh de-
fendants' First Amendment interest in choosing appropriate book title for their
work) (citing Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
207. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 939-40, afj'd in part, revd in
part, 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
208. For a discussion of Rogers v. Grimaldi, see supra notes 92-97 and accompa-
nying text.
209. For a discussion of Sugar Busters v. Brennan, see supra notes 100, 120, 125-
28 and accompanying text.
210. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 664 (citing Twin Peaks Prods., 996 F.2d at
1379, which quoted Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal
quotations omitted).
211. See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1379 (explaining Second Circuit's
need for district court to apply Polaroid digits of confusion to determine whether
likelihood of confusion was so great as to overcome presumption established in
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999).
212. See Westchester Media Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
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FTDA requires proof of actual harm, not merely a "likelihood of
dilution."213 As the FTDA prohibits any commercial use of a fa-
mous mark that "causes dilution," rather than prohibiting a "likeli-
hood of dilution," this standard best accords with the plain
meaning of the statute. 21 4 The Fifth Circuit therefore, was correct
in adopting the requirement that plaintiffs prove actual consum-
mated harm to establish liability under the FTDA.215
Finally, the Fifth Circuit properly intervened in vacating the
district court's finding that the magazine's title was mere commer-
cial speech and finding that the district court's issuance of a broad
injunction as infringement upon Westchester's substantive editorial
rights. The district court's injunction would have created a govern-
mental editorialship that regulated the speech content of Westches-
ter's magazine.2 16 Forcing the New POLO Magazine to limit its
content to that of Polo Player's Edition, would require constant su-
pervision of the amount of lifestyle content it provides.21 7 Such su-
pervision is impermissible according to the First Amendment.
213. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669-71. In doing so, the court explicitly
adopted the standard set forth in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458-59 (4th Cir. 1999), which
required a finding of actual harm, and rejected the test announced in Nabisco,
Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), which required only a likeli-
hood of confusion. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 670-71.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1) (1994). Nothing in the legislative history indi-
cates that Congress intended a "likelihood of dilution" standard for the FTDA. See
Klieger, supra note 69 at 835-40.
215. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 669-71 (citing Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at
452, which noted that FTDA's legislative history indicates congressional under-
standing that dilution results from actual dilution); see also Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Netscape Communications, Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1088 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
("The Act requires dilution; there is no remedy for 'likelihood of dilution.'"); Am.
Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 390-92 (D.N.J. 1999)
(requiring actual dilution).
216. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the First Amendment prohibits
government action that unduly restricts freedom of expression. See supra note 75
and accompanying text. By restricting the expression contained in Westchester's
magazine, its expression would have been unjustly suppressed. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (describing when First Amendment rights may be
suppressed by the government).
217. See Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 662. This produces an unnecessary
"gray area" as to how much lifestyle content is allowed, especially as the Old POLO
Magazine included expanded lifestyle content since 1987. See id. If a disclaimer,
adequately disavowing any affiliation with POLO Magazine, could prevent such a
"gray area" and prevent an unnecessarily broad penalty, it could be a far more
appropriate remedy. See id.
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An injunction for trademark infringement may be no broader
than necessary to prevent the deception of consumers.21 8 Because
PRL's and Westchester's consumers are assumed to understand a
disclaimer's message, the Fifth Circuit was correct in holding that a
disclaimer could be a more appropriate remedy and remanding the
case for a factual finding in support. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit
prevented PRL from policing the right to use the word "POLO" as
against the USPA's official magazine.
VI. IMPACT
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings dealt with an interesting
conflict between the PRL's rights to use the name "POLO," as a
designer who has successfully established the name in the fashion
industry, and Westchester's right to use the same name for "a maga-
zine of equestrian sports and lifestyles." 219 Although it has done
little to establish new law in the areas of Lanham Act trademark
infringement and First Amendment jurisprudence, it has clearly
demonstrated an incorporation of the legal frameworks of Rogers,220
and Sugar Busters221 and demonstrated the merits of disclaimer re-
lief when First Amendment rights and consumer confusion may
clash.
Westchester Media has developed new trademark law in the Fifth
Circuit by clarifying the standard required to establish a case under
the FfDA.222 Prior to this case, decisions in the Fifth Circuit had
avoided deciding whether a likelihood of confusion or evidence of
actual consummated harm is required under an FTDA claim.2 2 3
218. See Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc. v. Med. Dirs., Inc., 681
F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding preliminary injunction absolutely prohibit-
ing medical center from making further references to Bureau in their ads was
overbroad and would be narrowed to require only that references to Bureau con-
tain prominent disclaimer of Bureau's endorsement of program).
219. Westchester Media, 214 F.3d at 661. For the details of Westchester's
"POLO" registration, see supra notes 19, 24 and accompanying text.
220. For a discussion of Rogers v. Grimaldi, see supra notes 92-97 and accompa-
nying text.
221. For a discussion of Sugar Busters L.L.C. v. Brennan, see supra notes 100,
120, 125-28 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision on the requirements of
the FTDA, see supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
223. See Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d
935, 978-81 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (noting that it need not address FTDA requirement);
see also Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246, 261 n.28 (5th Cir.
1997) (declining to rule on FTDA claim); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950
F. Supp. 783, 797 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (using New York's anti-dilution statute as guide
to interpreting FTDA).
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This case affirms the plain meaning of the statute by requiring
plaintiffs to prove actual consummated harm.
Jon D. Marans
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